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This paper investigates the dynamics of individual portfolios in a unique dataset
containing the disaggregated wealth of all households in Sweden. Between 1999
and 2002, we observe little aggregate rebalancing in the nancial portfolio of par-
ticipants. These patterns conceal strong household-level evidence of active rebalanc-
ing, which on average o sets about one half of idiosyncratic passive variations in
the risky asset share. Wealthy, educated investors with better diversied portfolios
tend to rebalance more actively. We nd some evidence that households rebalance
towards a higher risky share as they become richer. We also study the decisions to
trade individual assets. Households are more likely to fully sell directly held stocks
if those stocks have performed well, and more likely to exit direct stockholding if
their stock portfolios have performed well; but these relationships are much weaker
for mutual funds, a pattern which is consistent with previous research on the dispo-
sition e ect among direct stockholders and performance sensitivity among mutual
fund investors. When households continue to hold individual assets, however, they
rebalance both stocks and mutual funds to o set about one sixth of the passive
variations in individual asset shares. Households rebalance primarily by adjusting
purchases of risky assets if their risky portfolios have performed poorly, and by
adjusting both fund purchases and full sales of stocks if their risky portfolios have
performed well. Finally, the tendency for households to fully sell winning stocks is
weaker for wealthy investors with diversied portfolios of individual stocks.
Keywords: Asset allocation, disposition e ect, diversication, participation, port-
folio rebalancing.
JEL Classication: D5, D9, E3, O1.1. Introduction
What drives time series variations in the asset allocation of individual investors? How
do households adjust their risk exposure in response to the portfolio returns that they
experience? Are household portfolios characterized by inertia or high turnover? Fi-
nancial theory suggests a wide range of motives for active trading and rebalancing at
the household level. Realized returns on nancial assets induce mechanical variations in
portfolio allocation to which an investor is passively exposed. An investor might ght
passive changes by actively rebalancing her portfolio when asset returns are expected to
be time-invariant. Changes in perceived investment opportunities, on the other hand,
might lead the investor to adopt a ight strategy that would amplify the decline in the
share of the worst-performing assets. Furthermore, trading decisions may reect not
only asset allocation objectives, but also a disposition to hold losing and sell winning
securities (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Odean 1998).
Equilibrium considerations suggest that aggregate ows from the household sec-
tor provide limited and potentially misleading information on individual rebalancing.
Consider for instance an economy in which households own all nancial assets. If the
aggregate value of risky securities falls, the average share of risky assets in household
portfolios must necessarily fall as well. Thus, the average individual investor cannot
ght aggregate variations in equity returns. When households have heterogeneous port-
folios, however, there could still be substantial rebalancing at the individual level. For
instance, it is an open question whether households with higher passive losses tend to
buy or sell risky assets.
The empirical investigation of household rebalancing therefore requires high-quality
and comprehensive micro data. Traditional datasets do not meet these requirements and
have unsurprisingly led to conicting answers on household behavior. Surveys, which
have been widely used in the household nance literature, only report the allocation
of household nancial wealth into broad asset classes (e.g. Bilias, Georgarakos and
Haliassos 2005). They permit the analysis of changes in the share of risky assets in
the nancial portfolio, but not the computation of active and passive changes. Thus,
surveys cannot tell us whether households attempt to o set passive variations in their
risky share.
Account datasets, such as 401k and brokerage accounts, present a partial view of -
nancial wealth and do not permit the computation of the risky share. Research based on
discount brokerage accounts nds evidence of intense trading activity (e.g. Odean 1999;
Barber and Odean 2000), while substantial inertia is observed in 401k accounts (e.g.
Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden 2003; Ameriks and Zeldes 2004; Choi, Laibson, Madrian
and Metrick 2002, 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001). These seemingly contradictory re-
sults may result from a selection bias in account datasets. For example, households may
1choose a discount broker precisely because they are (over)condent in their ability to
process information and intend to engage in high-frequency trading. And households
may trade less actively in retirement accounts than in other accounts that they control.
The Swedish dataset used in Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007, henceforth “CCS
2007”) allows us to overcome these issues. We assembled data supplied by Statistics
Sweden into a panel covering four years (1999-2002) and the entire country (about
4.8 million households). The information available on each resident is systematically
compiled by nancial institutions and corporations, and includes demographic charac-
teristics, wealth portfolio, and income. Our administrative dataset is therefore more
reliable than self-reported datasets, such as surveys. The wealth information is highly
disaggregated and provides the worldwide assets owned by the resident at the end of a
tax year. All nancial assets held outside retirement accounts are reported, including
bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks. However the database does not report the
exact date of a sale nor information on asset purchases.
In CCS (2007) we found that household portfolios of risky assets have important
idiosyncratic exposure, accounting for just over half the variance of return for the median
household. While underdiversication causes only modest welfare losses for most of the
population ex ante, the realized returns on household portfolios are heterogeneous ex
post. In this paper we exploit this cross-sectional variation to analyze the determinants
of portfolio rebalancing. The Swedish dataset is well suited for such an investigation
because we can compute the risky share of every household and decompose its changes
into passive and active components.
Our main results are the following. First, we study the dynamics of the risky asset
share among participating households. The equal-weighted share of household nancial
wealth invested in risky assets fell from 57% in 1999 to 45% in 2002, a decline that
implies very weak active rebalancing by the Swedish household sector as a whole in
response to the equity bear market of the early 2000’s. In striking contrast to this
aggregate result, individual households actively rebalanced their portfolios in response to
their own returns. Household-level regressions show that on average, active rebalancing
compensates about one half of idiosyncratic passive variations in the risky share.
We estimate a partial adjustment model for the risky share, with heterogeneous
adjustment speeds, and nd that nancially sophisticated households holding well di-
versied portfolios adjust more rapidly towards their target risky share. We also nd
some evidence that the target risky share increases when households become richer,
consistent with theories of declining relative risk aversion, portfolio insurance, or habit
formation (Brennan and Schwartz 1988; Campbell and Cochrane 1999; Carroll 2000,
2002; Constantinides 1990; Dybvig 1995).
Second, we study patterns of entry to and exit from risky nancial markets. The
overall stock market participation rate increased slightly between 1999 and 2002. At
2the microeconomic level, household demographics inuence entry and exit as one would
expect: nancially sophisticated households, with greater income, wealth, and educa-
tion, are more likely to enter, and less likely to exit. We are able to go beyond this
familiar result to see how portfolio characteristics inuence exit decisions. We nd that
households with initially more aggressive investment strategies are generally less likely
to exit, although poorly diversied households and those with extremely high initial
risky shares are slightly more likely to exit. If we consider mutual funds and directly
held stocks as separate asset classes, we nd that households are slightly more likely
to exit mutual fund holding when their mutual funds have performed badly, but much
more likely to exit direct stockholding when their stocks have performed well.
Third, we explore decisions to adjust positions in individual stocks and mutual
funds. We begin by examining decisions to fully sell positions. We nd that the
absolute value of the return on a stock or fund has a positive e ect on the probability
that a household will sell it. This e ect is much stronger for stocks with positive
returns (winners) than for stocks with negative returns (losers), but the asymmetry
is much weaker for mutual funds. We allow portfolio and household characteristics
to inuence the strength of these return e ects, and nd that wealthy investors with
diversied portfolios of individual stocks have a weaker propensity to dispose of winning
stocks and a stronger propensity to dispose of losers.
We also estimate a rebalancing model for positions that are not fully sold. We nd
that the passive change in the share of a stock or mutual fund in the risky portfolio
does explain the active change, but the e ect is weaker than we found when we treated
all risky assets as a homogeneous asset class. Instead of a rebalancing coe cient of
one half, we obtain coe cients of about one sixth which are only slightly greater for
stocks than for mutual funds. Thus the di erence in household decisionmaking with
respect to stocks and mutual funds shows up primarily in full sales rather than in partial
rebalancing decisions.
Finally, we investigate the relation between asset-level trading decisions and port-
folio rebalancing. Households primarily rebalance by using a small number of trading
strategies. When a household is unlucky in the sense that its risky portfolio performs
worse than average, rebalancing is mostly driven by adjustments in purchases of risky
assets. Conversely, when the household is lucky in the sense that its risky portfolio per-
forms better than average, the household rebalances primarily by adjusting full sales of
stocks and purchases of mutual funds.
Both our entry and exit results, and our results on asset-level trading decisions,
are consistent with two branches of the literature. The disposition e ect, that investors
hold losing stocks and sell winning stocks, has been documented using account data
on direct stockholdings by Odean (1998) and many others; Frazzini (2006), Goetzmann
and Massa (2008), and Grinblatt and Han (2005) present evidence that this behavior
3may contribute to momentum in stock returns. The literature on mutual fund ows, on
the other hand, nds evidence of performance chasing by individual investors (Chevalier
and Ellison 1997; Frazzini and Lamont 2007; Gruber 1996; Ippolito 1992; Ivkovic and
Weisbenner 2007a; Sirri and Tufano 1998). We nd similar patterns using di erent data
and a di erent approach for classifying stocks and funds as losers or winners. Dhar and
Zhu (2006) have recently found that households with higher self-reported income are
less prone to the disposition e ect in stock trading; our results are broadly consistent
with this, although we nd that wealth and portfolio diversication are more relevant
than income in predicting the strength of the disposition e ect.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic facts
about the evolution of risk-taking among Swedish households in the period 1999-2002.
In Section 3, we assess the magnitude of active rebalancing by decomposing household-
level portfolio variations into their passive and active components. In Section 4, we
estimate a partial adjustment model of portfolio risk and use it to ask which types of
households adjust their portfolios more rapidly. This section also asks whether increases
in nancial wealth increase households’ desired risk exposure. Section 5 explores entry
and exit decisions and asset-level rebalancing in relation to the disposition e ect. In
Section 6, we link households’ asset-level decisions to their rebalancing strategies. Sec-
tion 7 concludes. An Appendix available online (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2008)
presents details of data construction and estimation methodology.
2. How Has Risk-Taking Changed Over Time?
2.1. Data Description and Denitions
Swedish households pay taxes on both income and wealth. For this reason, the national
Statistics Central Bureau (SCB), also known as Statistics Sweden, has a parliamentary
mandate to collect highly detailed information on the nances of every household in
the country. We compiled the data supplied by SCB into a panel covering four years
(1999-2002) and the entire population of Sweden (about 4.8 million households). The
information available on each resident can be grouped into three main categories: de-
mographic characteristics, income, and disaggregated wealth.
Demographic information includes age, gender, marital status, nationality, birth-
place, education, and place of residence. The household head is dened as the individ-
ual with the highest income. The education variable includes high school and post-high
school dummies for the household head.
Income is reported by individual source. For capital income, the database reports the
income (interest, dividends) that has been earned on each bank account or each security.
For labor income, the database reports gross labor income and business sector.
The panel’s distinguishing feature is that it contains highly disaggregated wealth
4information. We observe the worldwide assets owned by each resident on December
31 of each year, including bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks. The information
is provided for each individual account or each security referenced by its International
Security Identication Number (ISIN). The database also records contributions made
during the year to private pension savings, as well as debt outstanding at year end and
interest paid during the year.
We will refer to the following asset classes throughout the paper. Cash consists
of bank account balances and money market funds. Stocks refer to direct holdings
only. Risky mutual funds are classied as either bond funds or equity funds. The latter
category is broadly dened to include any fund that invests a fraction of its assets in
stocks; that is, balanced funds are counted as equity funds.1 Risky assets include stocks
and risky mutual funds.
Following CCS (2007), we measure a household’s total nancial wealth as the sum of
its holdings in these asset classes, excluding from consideration illiquid assets such as real
estate or consumer durables, dened contribution retirement accounts, capital insurance
products that combine return guarantees with risky asset holdings, and directly held
bonds. Also, our measure of wealth is gross wealth and does not subtract mortgage
or other household debt. CCS (2007) summarize the relative magnitudes of all these
components of Swedish household balance sheets.
A participant is a household whose nancial wealth includes risky assets. In Table
1A, we report summary statistics on the assets held by participating households. To
facilitate international comparisons, we convert all nancial quantities into US dollars.
Specically, the Swedish krona traded at $0.1127 at the end of 2002, and this xed
conversion factor is used throughout the paper. The aggregate value of risky holdings
declined by about one half during the bear market. Between 1999 and 2002, household
stockholdings fell from $62 to $30 billion, and fund holdings from $53 to $29 billion.
Cash, on the other hand, increased from $49 to $57 billion over the same period.
In the same panel we also report aggregate statistics on stock and fund holdings com-
piled by the SCB and by the Swedish mutual fund association, Fondbolagens Förening
(FF).2 The o cial statistics are incomplete because the SCB does not specically report
the aggregate cash holdings of participants and the FF series only start in 2000. The
aggregate estimates obtained with our dataset closely match available o cial statistics.
In the Appendix, we also match quite closely o cial aggregate statistics on ows into
stocks and mutual funds. The aggregate ow into an asset class is generally quite mod-
est and never exceeds a few percentage points of the total household wealth invested in
1The managers of balanced funds periodically rebalance their holdings of cash and risky assets to
maintain a stable risky share. We do not try to measure this form of rebalancing, but treat balanced
funds like any other mutual funds, assuming that they have stable risk characteristics.
2These statistics can be downloaded at www.scb.se and www.fondbolagen.se.
5the class. Thus, the strong reduction in aggregate risky holdings reported in Table 1A
primarily results from price movements and not from large outows from the household
sector.
Following CCS (2007), we dene the following variables for each household  . The
complete portfolio contains all the stocks, mutual funds and cash owned by the house-
hold. The risky portfolio contains stocks and mutual funds but excludes cash. The
risky share      at date   is the weight of the risky portfolio in the complete portfolio.
Since the risky share is model-free, we use it extensively throughout the paper. The
household’s risky portfolio is also characterized by its standard deviation       and by
its systematic exposure      and Sharpe ratio      relative to a global equity benchmark,
the MSCI World Index. The denition and estimation of these quantities are discussed
in the Appendix.
The results presented in this paper are based on households that exist throughout
the 1999-2002 period. We impose no constraint on the participation status of these
households, but require that they satisfy the following nancial requirements at the
end of each year. First, disposable income must be strictly positive and the three-year
rolling average must be at least 1,000 Swedish kronor ($113). Second, nancial wealth
must be no smaller than 3,000 kronor ($339). For computational convenience, we have
selected a random panel of 100,000 households from the ltered population. Unless
stated otherwise, all the results in the paper are based on this xed subsample, and
unreported work conrms the strong robustness of the reported estimates to the choice
of alternative subsamples.
2.2. Cross-Sectional Dynamics of Participation and Risk-Taking
Household participation in risky asset markets increased from 61% to 65% between 1999
and 2002, as is reported in Table 1B. The inow is equal to 20% of nonparticipating
households, or about 8% of the entire population. The outow is 7% of participants,
or about 4% of the entire household population. These patterns are consistent with
the “participation turnover” documented for US data (Hurst, Luoh and Sta ord 1998,
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002b). In Section 5, we will further investigate the microeconomic
and portfolio determinants of entry and exit.
In studying rebalancing in the next two sections, we focus in each year on the large
group of households that maintain participation in risky asset markets throughout the
year. Between 1999 and 2002, the equal-weighted average risky share      of these
households fell from 57% to 45% (Table 1B). As illustrated in Figure 1A, this lower
mean reects a downward shift in the cross-sectional distribution of     , which is most
pronounced in the tails.
The downward shift in the risky share translates into a downward shift in complete
6portfolio risk. We illustrate in Figure 1B how the standard deviation of the complete
portfolio,           varies with the risky share     . The relation is almost linear and
has similar slopes in all years. Consistent with this nding, we verify in the Appendix
that the standard deviation of the risky portfolio,     , has a stable cross-sectional
distribution over time and is almost a at function of the risky share.3
These results imply that Swedish households adjust their overall risk exposure pri-
marily by scaling up or down their risky portfolio, passively or actively, rather by altering
its composition. This justies our emphasis on modelling      in the next two sections.
3. Passive and Active Rebalancing of the Risky Share
3.1. Decomposition of the Risky Share
The change in a household’s risky share is partly determined by the household’s active
trades and partly by the returns on its risky securities. For instance, the risky share
tends to mechanically fall in a severe bear market. For this reason, we now decompose
the change in the risky share between year   and year  +1      +1        into a passive
change, driven by the returns on risky assets, and an active change resulting from
household rebalancing decisions. This decomposition is empirically meaningful because
of the comprehensive individual asset information available in our dataset.
The passive risky return 1+    +1 is the proportional change in value of a household’s
risky portfolio if the household does not trade risky assets during the year. It is easily
computed from the initial risky portfolio and asset returns. Let   
      denote the share
of asset   (1        ) in the risky portfolio. If the investor does not trade between date
  and date  +1, the risky portfolio value at  +1is its value at   times its gross return
1+    +1 =
P 
 =1   
     (1+    +1)  We compute returns     +1 excluding dividends, as is
appropriate if households consume dividends rather than reinvesting them, but we verify
in the Appendix that our empirical results are essentially unchanged when dividends
are included in returns.
The passive risky share is the risky share at the end of the year if the household
does not trade risky assets during the year. It is a function of the initial risky share
and the passive risky return:
 
 
   +1 =   (    ;    +1) 
where
  ( ; )  
 (1 +  )
 (1 +  ) + (1    )(1 +   )
 
3Of course, the stability of average      across risky share bins does not imply that all households
own the same risky portfolio. We will indeed show in Section 3 that there is substantial heterogeneity
in individual portfolio returns.
7The passive change is the change in the risky share during the year if the household
trades no risky assets during the year:
    +1 =  
 
   +1        
It is equal to zero if the investor is initially invested exclusively in cash (     = 0) or
exclusively in risky assets (     = 1). The passive change is a hump-shaped function of
the initial share if       , as investors presumably expect, but a U-shaped function of
the initial share if         as in our data from the bear market of 2000—2002.
The active change in the risky share,     +1 =     +1    
 
   +1, is the movement in
the risky share that does not result mechanically from realized returns and thus reects
portfolio rebalancing. The total change in the risky share can be written as the sum of
the active and passive changes:
    +1        =     +1 +     +1 
We will also use the analogous decomposition in logs:
ln(    +1)   ln(    )=    +1 +     +1 
where     +1 = ln( 
 
   +1)   ln(    ) and     +1 = ln(    +1)   ln( 
 
   +1) respectively
denote the active and passive changes in logs.
These decompositions treat changes in riskless asset holdings, caused by saving,
dissaving, or dividends received on risky assets, as active rebalancing. An alternative
approach would be to calculate the passive risky share that would result from house-
hold saving or dissaving, assumed to take place through accumulation or decumulation
of riskless assets, in the absence of any trades in risky assets. This alternative decom-
position is attractive to the extent that households build up and run down their riskless
balances for liquidity reasons that are unrelated to their investment policies. We do
not pursue this alternative decomposition further here, but in our structural model of
active rebalancing we do allow for a white noise error that may capture high-frequency
savings e ects.
3.2. Rebalancing Regressions
Changes in a household’s risky share tend to be strongly a ected by the initial level of
the risky share. One reason for this is purely mechanical: the total change     +1     
is bounded between       and 1        in the presence of short sales and leverage
constraints. In addition, there may be behavioral reasons, including sluggish rebalancing
and high-frequency variation in riskless balances, why the risky share may be subject
to transitory shocks and gradual reversion to a long-term mean.
8The scatter plots in Figure 2 show the passive, active and total changes in levels
between 2001 and 2002 versus the initial risky share for a subsample of 10,000 house-
holds. In panel A, the passive change is a U-shaped function of the initial share, as
one expects in a bear market. Panel B reveals that the active change is close to zero
for a sizeable group of households, who trade very little or not at all during the year.
This observation is consistent with the inertia documented on other datasets. There
is, however, considerable heterogeneity, and substantially positive or negative values
of the active change are observed for many households. Moreover, the active change
appears to decrease with the initial share, which suggests that the risky share tends
to revert towards its cross-sectional mean. In panel C, the total change is contained
in the band dened by       and 1         The U-shaped inuence of passive change
is apparent, consistent with the inertia of some households. Overall, the scatter plots
reveal substantial heterogeneity and strong dependence with respect to the initial risky
share      
The e ects of passive change and initial portfolio weight on active change are clearly
visible when we group households into bins according to their initial portfolio weight, and
plot the equal-weighted average within each bin of the total change, the passive change
and the active change. Figure 3 shows the results for the entire 2000-2002 period (Panel
A) and for each year separately (Panels B to D). Because of the bear market during
our sample period, the passive change is a U-shaped function of the initial exposure
      Active rebalancing is hump-shaped and overall decreasing with the initial share,
which is consistent with both mean reversion in the risky share and a tendency to o set
passive changes.
In Table 2, we investigate the household-level relation between active and passive
changes by estimating a rebalancing regression. We compare results in levels and in
logs, but write the rebalancing regression here in logs:
    +1 =  0  +1 +  1    +1 +  2(ln       ln    )+    +1  (3.1)
where ln     denotes the equal-weighted average of the log risky share. The regressor
(ln       ln    ) is included to capture the dependence of the active change on the
initial risky share that was illustrated in Figure 2. We estimate (3.1) by OLS, both for
pooled data, with year xed e ects, and for each separate cross-section. We include in
the regression only households that participate both in year   and in year   +1 . This
allows us to disentangle inframarginal rebalancing from entry and exit decisions.
A fully passive household would be characterized by zero regression coe cients:
 0  +1 =  1 =  2 =0   The estimates of  1 are in fact close to  0 5 in the pooled
regressions, and range between  0 8 and  0 4 in yearly cross-sections. Thus we nd
that households o set about one half of the passive change through active rebalancing.
We obtain negative estimates of  2, implying that households with a large initial risky
9share have reduced their risk exposure more aggressively than other investors.
To understand the parameter estimates in Table 2 we now examine a few numer-
ical examples. Consider a household invested in the value-weighted average household
portfolio, with an initial share equal to the average equal-weighted share at the end of
2001:      = 52 3%. In 2002, the average household portfolio yields  32 1%, and the
household’s corresponding passive share is 41 7%. We infer from the pooled regression
reported in Table 2A that the predicted active change equals 2 4%.
Now consider an unlucky household with the same initial share but with a realized
risky return of  55 1%. Among all participants, the household is in the 5th percentile
of the risky return distribution. The corresponding passive change is  20 0% and the
predicted active change then equals 7 1%  Alternatively, consider a lucky household with
the same initial share but a realized risky return in the 95th percentile (     =  7 3%).
The active change is then  1 4%  Agents with returns below the cross-sectional average
buy risky assets from agents with higher returns. An agent with an average share and
an average return, on the other hand, makes fewer trades. The intuition that extreme
agents trade more than average agents is familiar in equilibrium models.4
The rebalancing regression also predicts the e ect of the initial share. For instance
a household that has an initial share in the 5th percentile (     =3  9%) and owns
the value-weighted average household portfolio would select an active change of 6 2%.
Similarly, a household with an initial share in the 95th percentile (     = 95 5%) with
an average portfolio would select an active change of  10 8%  Thus, the initial share
and the realized return both have substantial quantitative e ects on the active change.
In the online appendix (CCS 2008), we verify the robustness of the rebalancing
regression by classifying households into initial risky share bins and regressing the active
change onto the passive change within each bin. The estimate of the slope coe cient  1
is strongly and signicantly negative in each risky share bin, so households with high
and low involvement in risky nancial markets all appear to be rebalancing actively.
The rebalancing coe cient is unusually large and negative in the lowest risky share
bin, particularly when we run the regression in levels. This likely results in part from
a boundary e ect. During the bear market, most households with low initial exposure
(       0) incur small passive losses in levels, which bring them closer to the short
sales constraint     +1   0. Such households may substantially increase their risky
shares, which will be associated with strongly positive active changes. Very negative
active changes, on the other hand, are infeasible in levels (but are still in principle
feasible in logs). The levels regression in the lowest risky share bin is therefore driven
by observations with small negative passive and large positive active changes, resulting
in a very negative slope coe cient  1. The coe cient in the lowest risky share bin is
4See Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras and Sodini (2004) for an example based on idiosyncratic nontradable
risk.
10somewhat less anomalous when we run the regression in logs, which encourages us to
use a log specication in our subsequent analysis.
3.3. Robustness Checks
Churning. One might worry that households do not deliberately rebalance the risky
share, but instead randomly buy and sell risky assets–that is, churn their portfolios.
Portfolio turnover causes measurement error in the passive share, so churning biases the
regression coe cient of the active change on the passive change towards  1. In this case
our results tell us that there is active trading, but are not informative about deliberate
rebalancing. A simple robustness check consists of conning attention to households
that do not purchase new risky assets during the year. In other words, we exclude any
household that has strictly positive holdings in period   +1of a risky security that
it did not own at all in period  . In the Appendix, we report that the corresponding
rebalancing propensity is about  0 3, which is weaker than the estimates in Table 2 but
still substantial.5 These estimates are conservative, since they exclude households that
purchase new assets as part of an active rebalancing strategy. This analysis suggests
that churning alone cannot explain the strongly negative estimates of the passive change
coe cient reported in our rebalancing regressions.
Automatic Investment Plans. Automatic investment plans are another source of
apparent rebalancing. Consider a household that invests a xed monetary amount in
a basket of risky assets every year, and makes no other trades. The active change is
then a decreasing function of the risky portfolio’s performance, while the passive change
increases with performance. Automatic investment schemes can therefore generate a
negative correlation between active and passive changes.
Automatic investment plans typically imply the purchase of the same assets every
year. We have already found, in our robustness check for churning, that households that
purchase no new assets have a weaker rebalancing propensity, suggesting that automatic
investment plans cannot be driving our results. Further, a household that only trades
automatically will neither buy nor sell assets and will therefore own the same set of
assets at the end of years   and   +1 . We show in the Appendix that such households
also have rebalancing propensities that are slightly lower than those reported in Table
2. It is thus very unlikely that automatic investments account for our results.
We complement this analysis with a regression on a simulated dataset of automatic
savers. The automatic investment is assumed to be an exogenous percentage   of initial
nancial wealth  We set   equal to the average ratio in each year of savings to nancial
wealth for households purchasing no new assets during the year. In the Appendix,
5The appendix also estimates the adjustment model of the next section for households that purchase
no new assets. The estimated adjustment speed is actually slightly higher for these households.
11we regress the implied active change on the passive change and obtain only modest
rebalancing propensities. Results are similar when we set   equal to a constant 3%,
close to the time-series average of the yearly   ratios used in our main approach.
Cash Balances. Random uctuations in cash balances are another concern. In the
next section we develop a partial adjustment model that allows high-frequency shocks
to a ect the target risky share. In the Appendix, we instead use a bootstrap simulation
to investigate this issue. Specically, we assume that households do not rebalance or
trade risky assets during the year, and that their cash balances       follow the process:
     +1 =    
   +1       The shocks    
   +1 are i.i.d. across households, and sampled from
the empirical cross-sectional distribution of the growth rates of cash balances  The
simulation generates only modest rebalancing propensities, which shows that random
uctuations in cash balances cannot explain the rebalancing results of this section.
4. An Adjustment Model of the Risky Share
4.1. Specication
The regressions of Section 3 have shown that rebalancing is inuenced by both the initial
share and the passive change. This motivates us to specify a model in which households
sluggishly adjust their portfolios towards a desired risky share   
   +1  Our approach is
based on three main assumptions.
First, the natural log of the observed risky share     +1 is a weighted average of the
log desired share   
   +1 and the log passive share  
 
   +1:
ln(    +1)=   ln(  
   +1) + (1     )ln( 
 
   +1)+    +1  (4.1)
The error     +1 is assumed to be i.i.d., resulting from measurement error, high-frequency
variations in riskless balances, and any other idiosyncratic factors inuencing portfolio
composition. The coe cient    controls the household’s speed of adjustment. It can
take any real value, but values between zero and one are economically most sensible.
If    =1   the household adjusts instantaneously, and the observed share is equal to
the desired share plus an error: ln(    +1) = ln(  
   +1)+    +1  A sluggish household
(     1), on the other hand, is also sensitive to the passive share.
Second, the speed of adjustment coe cient    is a linear function of observable
characteristics:
   =  0 +  0      (4.2)
where the vector      is independent of the errors      and     +1  This specication
captures the empirical relation between speed of adjustment and measures of nancial
sophistication such as wealth and education.
12Third, the level of the log desired risky share can vary in an arbitrary manner
across households, but the change in the log desired risky share is related to household
characteristics by
 ln(  
   +1)= 0  +1 +  0
 +1      (4.3)
This equation has a convenient interpretation when households have constant relative
risk aversion    and returns on the risky asset are i.i.d. The desired risky share of
household   is then   
   +1 =     +1 (      +1)  and changes in the log of the desired
risky share,  ln(  
   +1)= ln(    +1     +1)  are driven only by perceived variations
in investment opportunities and not by risk aversion. Equation (4.3) can then be viewed
as expressing changes in perceived investment opportunities as a time-specic function
of an intercept and household characteristics. This convenient property does not hold in
levels, which supports our choice of a log specication. In practice, many other factors
can of course alter the desired risky share, including changes in real estate holdings,
human capital, background risk, or wealth if the agent has decreasing relative risk
aversion.
4.2. Estimation
We now turn to the estimation of the adjustment model. In our specication, a house-
hold’s target share ln(  
   +1) is not observed but its change  ln(  
   +1) is a parametric
function of characteristics (4.3). The rst step is therefore to di erence the portfolio
share (4.1):
 ln(    +1)=   ln(  
   +1) + (1     ) ln( 
 
   +1)+    +1        
We then substitute out    and  ln(  
   +1), using (4.2) and (4.3), and obtain the
reduced-form specication:
 ln(    +1)=  +1 +  0 ln( 
 
   +1)+ 0     ln( 
 
   +1)
+ 0
 +1     +  0
     +1     +     +1         (4.4)
The reduced-form coe cients relate as follows to the structural parameters of the ad-
justment model:   +1 =  0 0  +1   0 =1   0  =       +1 =   +1 0 +  0  +1   and
  +1 =   0
 +1 
The error term of the reduced-form specication (4.4),     +1         follows a rst-
order moving average process. A high realization of      feeds into a high share      and
a high passive share  
 
   +1, which implies that the error     +1        and the regressor
 ln( 
 
   +1) = ln  (    ;    +1)   ln( 
 
   ) are negatively correlated. Because of this
problem, equation (4.4) cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS). We handle this by nding a set of instruments that are correlated with the
13explanatory variables in (4.4) but uncorrelated with the error term. The period-  +1
zero-rebalancing passive change
ln  ( 
 
   ;    +1)   ln( 
 
   )
is the passive change that would be observed at  +1if the household did not rebalance at
 . Because rebalancing is limited, this variable should be positively correlated with the
actual change in the passive share. At the same time, if the return     +1 is independent
of the errors, the period-  +1zero-rebalancing passive change is uncorrelated with     
and can therefore be used in a set of instruments.
In Table 3, we estimate the adjustment model for the special case where all house-
holds have the same adjustment speed and target change, which corresponds to the
restriction   =   =0 . The OLS regression of the total log change in the risky share on
the passive log change and a time xed e ect,
 ln(    +1)=  +1 +  0 ln( 
 
   +1)+    +1 
gives an estimate for  0 of  0 12  This estimate is negatively biased, because the re-
gressor  ln( 
 
   +1) and the residual     +1 are negatively correlated. When we correct
the bias by running instrumental variables (IV) estimation with an intercept, the log
of the initial passive share, and the zero-rebalancing passive change as instruments, we
obtain a considerably higher  0 estimate of 0 36  The di erence is economically mean-
ingful. The OLS estimate implies an adjustment speed  0 =1   0 that is larger than
unity, while the IV estimate implies an adjustment speed  0 =0  64  which is broadly
consistent with the rebalancing regressions in Section 3.
The next step is to estimate the adjustment model allowing observable household
characteristics to a ect the adjustment speed and the change in the desired log risky
share. The set of characteristics includes demographic, nancial, and portfolio charac-
teristics. The rst category includes age, household size, and dummies for households
that have high-school education, post-high-school education, missing education data
(most common among older and immigrant households), or are immigrants. The sec-
ond category includes disposable income, contributions to private pension plans as a
fraction of a three-year average of disposable income, log nancial wealth, log real es-
tate wealth, log of total debt liabilities, and dummies for households that are retired,
unemployed, self-employed (“entrepreneurs”), and students. The third category, which
is unique to our dataset, includes the standard deviation of the risky portfolio and the
Sharpe ratio of the risky portfolio.
The inclusion of nancial wealth     as a household characteristic creates a new
di culty. Financial wealth depends on the random cash balance observed at the end of
year  , and is therefore correlated with the measurement error       A natural solution
is to use as an instrument passive nancial wealth      1(1 +   
   ), where 1+  
     
14     1(1+    )+(1      1)(1+  ) denotes the gross passive return on the complete
portfolio. This leads us to dene the following set of instruments: 1) an intercept, 2)
the period-  log passive share; 3) the period-  +1zero-rebalancing passive change; 4)
the period-  passive nancial wealth; 5) a vector of characteristics uncorrelated with
the measurement error, and 6) the log passive share, zero-rebalancing passive change,
passive nancial wealth and characteristics interacted with the vector of characteristics.
To simplify the estimation of the full model (4.4), given that we have a short panel
with only two years of data after di erencing, we estimate the reduced form assuming
constant coe cients over time on the household characteristics:   +1 =  , and   +1 =  .
The structural restrictions of the model then imply that the time xed e ects   +1 are
also constant, as are the structural coe cients in the equation for the change in the
desired risky share, (4.3):  0  +1 =  0 and   +1 =  . We do not impose constant time
xed e ects, but nd them to be almost identical in 2001 and 2002.
IV estimates of this model are reported in the rst set of columns of Table 4. Each
characteristic is standardized to have zero cross-sectional mean. We also normalize to
unity the cross-sectional standard deviation of each continuous characteristic, so the
reported regression coe cient reveals the e ect of a one-standard-deviation change in
the characteristic. To keep the table at a manageable size, we only report the structural
vectors   and   of the full regression. The median value of the speed parameter is
0.73 and the average log target change is -0.18 in 2002. These numbers are consistent
with the rebalancing regressions in Section 3 and imply a modest revision in the target
share. The estimates of   and   are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the nonlinear
interacted term  0
         
The most striking result in Table 4 is that the speed of adjustment tends to increase
with variables associated with nancial sophistication, such as education, disposable
income, debt, and nancial and real estate wealth. In addition, households with well
diversied portfolios (high Sharpe ratios) have higher adjustment speeds. Entrepreneur-
ial activity, retirement, unemployment, and household size, on the other hand, reduce
the adjustment speed.
Changes in the target risky share are less consistently related to household char-
acteristics. Households with greater nancial wealth reduce their target less. Real
estate wealth, on the other hand, works in the opposite direction, perhaps because the
booming Swedish real estate market reduced the attractiveness of stocks to real-estate-
oriented investors in 2001 and 2002. Well diversied and aggressive households, with
higher Sharpe ratios and riskier portfolios, reduce their target share more; but so do
larger, older, and immigrant households that normally invest cautiously (CCS 2007).
The estimates in Table 4 can be used to compute the predicted speed parameter
and target change of every household. The cross-sectional distribution of the speed   
has a median value of 0.73, a 5th percentile of 0.53, and a 95th percentile of 0.86,
15numbers which seem quite reasonable. Similarly, the target change  ln(  
   +1) has a
5th percentile of -29%, a median value of -18%, and a 95th percentile of 5%, which again
seem quite reasonable in a severe bear market.
In the appendix, we report the average characteristic values for households at dif-
ferent percentiles of the predicted adjustment speed and target change distributions.
The average household at the 5th percentile of adjustment speed has disposable income
of about $20,700 and wealth of $10,500, 47% of which is invested in risky assets with
a Sharpe ratio of 0.22. 35% of these slowly adjusting households have a high school
education, and 6% have a college education. At the 95th percentile of adjustment
speed, by contrast, the average household has disposable income of $42,800 and wealth
of $56,200, 70% of which is invested in risky assets with a Sharpe ratio of 0.31. 95%
of these rapidly adjusting households have a high school education, and 71% have a
college education. In short, rapidly adjusting households appear to be more nancially
sophisticated than slowly adjusting households.
The appendix also reports results when we estimate the adjustment model separately
for the years 2001 and 2002, allowing both adjustment speeds and target changes to vary
across years. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4, although
adjustment speeds appear to be faster in 2001 than in 2002, and some of the individual
characteristics have coe cients that are unstable over time.
4.3. Impact of Wealth Changes on Risk-Taking
In the rst set of columns of Table 4, we have used slowly evolving demographic
and nancial variables as household characteristics that may inuence portfolio ad-
justment. We now explore the possibility that portfolio decisions are also a ected by
high-frequency variation in nancial wealth. Several branches of nancial theory sug-
gest that an increase in nancial wealth might increase the propensity to take risk. In
the presence of borrowing constraints, individuals become less risk-averse as they be-
come richer and thus less likely to face a binding constraint in the future. Even in the
absence of such frictions, investors with decreasing relative risk aversion tend to hold
a higher risky share as their wealth goes up. Carroll (2000, 2002) builds such a utility
function, and documents a positive empirical relation between household wealth and
the risky share. Models of portfolio insurance (Brennan and Schwartz 1988) and habit
formation (Constantinides 1990, Dybvig 1995, Campbell and Cochrane 1999) also imply
a positive relation between wealth and the risky share, because richer agents are more
willing to take risk as their wealth moves further above the minimum level required by
the portfolio insurance policy or the present value of the future habit.
In the second set of columns of Table 4, we reestimate the adjustment model using the
contemporaneous change in log nancial wealth as an additional household characteristic
16that can a ect the change in the target. We add one instrument to the previous set,
the zero-rebalancing return on the complete portfolio, that is, the return that each
household would earn at   +1if it did not rebalance at  . We nd that an increase
in log nancial wealth leads to a higher target risky share, while the impact of other
characteristics is largely unchanged.
In the Appendix, we show that results are similar when we estimate the model
separately for the years 2001 and 2002, although the e ect of the change in log nan-
cial wealth on the target risky share is stronger in 2002. The Appendix also reports
similar results when we allow the change in log nancial wealth to a ect the adjust-
ment speed as well as the desired risky share. We nd little variation in the change
in log nancial wealth across rapidly adjusting and slowly adjusting households, but
large variation across households with high and low predicted changes in the target
risky share. Households at the 5th percentile of the target change experience average
nancial wealth declines of 44%, while households at the 95th percentile of the target
change experience average nancial wealth increases of 31%.
In a recent study, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2007) assess the empirical relation be-
tween wealth and the risky share using US data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID). They regress the change in the risky share (in levels) on the change in
nancial wealth (in logs) and control variables, and obtain a small and slightly negative
wealth coe cient. They attribute this result to inertia. When a household saves in the
form of cash during the year and only partially rebalances its nancial portfolio, its
risky share tends to fall mechanically.
In the Appendix, we estimate the Brunnermeier-Nagel regression on our Swedish
dataset. The OLS estimate of the regression coe cient is slightly negative, consistent
with Brunnermeier and Nagel’s nding; but it becomes positive when we estimate the
regression by instrumental variables. Similarly, we nd a positive relation between the
change in the risky share and the lagged change in nancial wealth. These results
are robust to separate estimation of the regression in the years 2001 and 2002. Thus,
controlling for endogeneity problems and household inertia, the Swedish data do show
some evidence for a positive link between wealth changes and risk-taking.
4.4. Connection with Rebalancing Regressions
The adjustment model of this section is intimately related to the rebalancing regressions
we estimated in section 3. When the adjustment speed and target changes are the same
for all households, the adjustment model implies:
    +1 =   0  +1        +1    (ln       ln  
   )+    +1  (4.5)
which is analogous but not exactly identical to the rebalancing regression (3.1). The
similarity suggests that the adjustment speed should be close to the regression coe -
17cients reported in Table 2B; this is indeed the case in our empirical results since the
median speed    and the linear regression coe cient   1 are both about one half. The
distance to the target, ln      ln  
     represents the only di erence between (3.1) and
(4.5). We can therefore view (3.1) as a reduced-form specication in which all house-
holds have the same speed of adjustment and the distance to the target, ln     ln  
    
is proxied by a rescaled distance to the cross-sectional mean,  (ln       ln    ) 
We show in the Appendix that the adjustment model with heterogeneous agents
leads to additional terms in the rebalancing regressions. Section 4 thus improves on
the specication in Section 3 by: (1) providing more precise micro foundations; (2)
correctly estimating the structural parameters even though the target is unobserved;
and (3) allowing for heterogeneity in the adjustment speed and the target change.
In the Appendix, we investigate the role of household characteristics in the rebalanc-
ing regression (3.1). The reduction in the risky share is in all years less pronounced for
households with higher nancial wealth or debt. These households were more willing to
maintain their proportional investments in risky assets than were other Swedish house-
holds. We interact demographic variables with passive changes, and nd that wealthier
and more sophisticated households tend to have more negative regression coe cients of
active changes on passive changes; that is, they rebalance more actively. These ndings
conrm the results of the adjustment model. They are limited, however, in that they
do not allow us to disentangle household inertia from changes in the target risky share,
as the adjustment model can do.
5. Asset-Class Participation, Asset-Level Rebalancing, and the Dispo-
sition E ect
We now study household decisions to participate in asset classes (risky assets, mutual
funds, and direct stockholding) and to rebalance positions in individual assets. We
relate these decisions to the disposition e ect, the tendency to realize gains and hold
on to losses, where gains and losses are measured relative to the asset’s purchase price.
The disposition e ect was identied by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and has been widely
documented (e.g. Odean 1998).
The Swedish dataset unfortunately does not provide the date or price of individual
asset trades. For this reason, we use an asset’s return during the year as an alterna-
tive measure of performance. This implies that we are assessing the robustness of the
disposition e ect to this alternative benchmark. The Swedish dataset has an impor-
tant compensating advantage: we can relate the disposition e ect to demographic and
nancial characteristics of households, as well as the characteristics of the portfolios
they hold. This allows us to extend the recent nding of Dhar and Zhu (2006) that
households with higher self-reported income are less prone to the disposition e ect.
185.1. Entry and Exit at the Risky Portfolio and Asset Class Levels
We begin by investigating the probability that a household enters or exits risky asset
markets. In Table 5, we run pooled probit regressions of the form      =  ( 0
     + 0  ) 
where      denotes participation status,      is the vector of characteristics, and  0   is
a time-dependent intercept. The time interval is annual, and we pool data from 2000,
2001, and 2002. To facilitate comparison, we report in the last three rows the rates of
entry to and exit from risky asset markets in each year.
In the rst set of three columns, we analyze the probability that a nonparticipant
in year   holds risky assets in year   +1 . The rst two columns report coe cients and
t-statistics, while the third column assesses the economic magnitude of the coe cient
estimates by reporting the impact on the entry probability of increasing a non-dummy
regressor by one standard deviation, or setting a dummy variable equal to one. This
impact depends on the base rate of entry; we report it for the year 2001, in which the
overall entry rate was 5.7%, much lower than the rate in 2000 and slightly greater than
the rate in 2002.
The probability of entry increases with standard measures of nancial sophistication
such as education, nancial and real estate wealth, and the private pension savings
rate. Conversely, the exit probability decreases with variables associated with investor
sophistication, as shown in the middle three columns of Table 5. The entry and exit
regressions are thus remarkably symmetric and consistent with earlier research on cross-
sectional data. Household characteristics that predict participation in a cross-section
(e.g. Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli 2002, CCS 2007) also help to explain entry and exit
in the panel.
In the last three columns of Table 5, we investigate how the exit probability is a ected
by portfolio characteristics. The exit probability decreases with the initial risky share
and the standard deviation of the risky portfolio. More aggressive agents have higher
risk-tolerance and are less likely to entirely give up the benets of nancial risktaking.
A complementary explanation is that households sluggishly adjust their portfolios, as in
Section 4; more aggressive investors are then more reluctant to dispose of all their risky
assets. The exit probability, however, increases with extreme risk-taking, as measured
by a dummy equal to unity if the risky share exceeds ninety ve percent. Extreme risk-
takers presumably have limited understanding of nancial risk and may be prone to
panic selling in a bear market.
A household is also more likely to exit if it is undiversied (low Sharpe ratio     ). Fi-
nally, we consider the performance of the risky portfolio during the year, and distinguish
between positive returns (winning portfolios) and negative returns (losing portfolios).
Large absolute returns tend to increase the probability of exit, and the e ect is slightly
more pronounced for winners than losers.
19We next investigate the separate roles of direct stock and mutual fund holdings. It
is useful to decompose the overall Sharpe ratio into its stock and fund components. Let
     denote the share of direct stockholdings in the risky portfolio,        and       
the Sharpe ratios of the stock and fund portfolios, and        and        their standard
deviations. The Sharpe ratio of the risky portfolio satises:
     =        +        
where the components of the Sharpe ratio attributable to each asset class are given by
       =       
          
    
 
       =       
(1       )      
    
 
The contribution of an asset class to the overall Sharpe ratio is large if the household
holds a diversied portfolio of assets in the class, which represents a large fraction of its
risk exposure.
In Table 6, we investigate exit decisions by asset class for a subset of households
that initially own both stocks and mutual funds. As in the previous tables, we include
nancial and demographic variables and the risky portfolio’s standard deviation. We
also consider the contributions of stocks and funds to the overall Sharpe ratio and the
performance during the year of the household’s stocks and funds. These variables are
used to explain the probability that a participating household disposes of all its risky
assets (rst three columns), all its directly held stocks (next three columns) or all its
mutual funds (last three columns).
Most of the patterns in Table 6 are consistent with those already shown in Table 5.
The striking new result in Table 6 is that the exit probability from risky asset markets
increases strongly with the performance of winning stock portfolios. Winning stock
portfolio performance has an even greater impact on the probability of exiting direct
stockholding, as shown in the second column of the table. These ndings are consistent
with the disposition e ect on direct stockholdings: the owner of a winning stock portfolio
is more likely to sell it and leave nancial markets. There is little evidence in the table of
a comparable disposition e ect for mutual funds. The owner of a winning mutual fund
portfolio is slightly more likely to liquidate it, but the e ect is small and statistically
insignicant; losses have a larger e ect on the mutual fund sales probability, consistent
with the literature on performance-sensitivity of mutual fund holdings (Chevalier and
Ellison 1997; Frazzini and Lamont 2007; Gruber 1996; Ippolito 1992; Sirri and Tufano
1998; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2007a).
205.2. Dynamics of Individual Asset Shares
We now investigate how a household adjusts during year   +1the asset positions that
it holds at the end of year  . Since exit decisions have been addressed in Section 5.1, we
consider only households that own risky assets in both years. Also, we conne attention
to assets which are held at the end of year   and do not attempt to model household
decisions to purchase new assets.
A household owning a stock at the end of 2000 had, by the end of 2001, partially
sold it with probability 27%, fully sold it with probability 16%, held on to it with
probability 22%, and bought additional units of the same stock with probability 35%.
Partial sales and partial purchases are thus more frequent than full sales or continued
holdings. As reported in the Appendix, this property holds in all years and is even
more pronounced for mutual funds: the probability of a fund’s full sale is less than 10%
while the probability of a partial purchase is about 60%. The high probability of partial
purchases for funds is attributable in part to the dividend reinvestment plans o ered by
most investment companies. Even though full sales are a relatively limited phenomenon,
we begin by studying them separately given their importance in the disposition e ect
literature.
Full Sales. In Table 7, we analyze the probability that a household owning a risky
asset   at date   has fully disposed of it by the end of year   +1. The regression distin-
guishes between stocks and funds, and between assets with positive returns (winners)
and negative returns (losers) during the year. We include household demographic and
nancial characteristics, and portfolio characteristics, both directly and interacted with
the return on the asset during the year.6 The table reports the coe cients on the char-
acteristics interacted with return but omits the direct coe cients; the full regression is
reported in the Appendix.
The probability of fully selling an asset increases with the absolute value of its
performance during the year. Households are more likely to fully sell extreme losers
or extreme winners than stocks and funds that have close to zero returns. For stocks,
this e ect is much more pronounced for winners than for losers, which seems consistent
with a disposition e ect on direct stockholdings. For funds, performance also impacts
the probability of a full sale, but there is substantially less asymmetry between losers
and winners. The tendency to sell losing funds is consistent with the literature on
performance sensitivity. For winning funds, however, household behavior is both driven
by the tendency to hold on to winners, for instance because they are run by skilled
managers, but also a tendency to sell winning assets in order to rebalance the risky
6In Table 7, we assign a value of zero to the characteristic of an asset class if the household has no
investments in this class. A similar convention is used in the remainder of the section.
21portfolio. The connection between asset trades and portfolio rebalancing will be further
investigated in section 6.
Financial and portfolio characteristics have a substantial impact on the probability
of a full sale of stock. Wealthier households with riskier overall portfolios and better
diversied stock portfolios are less likely to sell a winning stock but more likely to sell
a losing stock. These e ects reduce the asymmetry between winners and losers and
therefore weaken the disposition e ect on direct stockholdings. Losing funds are also
more likely to be sold by wealthier households, but we otherwise nd little signicance
of characteristics in the regressions that predict full sales of mutual funds.
Overall, the table reveals that more sophisticated and aggressive households, with
larger portfolios of directly held stocks, appear to be less prone to the disposition e ect.
Partial Sales, Continued Holdings and Partial Purchases. We have shown in
previous sections that households ght idiosyncratic passive variations in the risky share.
We now investigate whether they also rebalance individual security positions in the
risky portfolio. The analysis excludes full sales, but considers partial sales, continued
holdings and partial purchases. In the Appendix, we check that the evidence of asset-
level rebalancing is even stronger when we include full sales.
For each household    we dene   
      as the share of asset   in the risky (not the
complete) portfolio at the end of period  ,     +1 as the net return on the risky portfolio
between   and   +1, and     +1 as the net return on asset  . If the household does not
trade risky assets in the next period, the asset’s passive share at the end of   +1is:
 
  
     +1 =   
     
1+    +1
1+    +1
 
Let   
     +1 =   
     +1  
  
     +1 and   
     +1 =  
  
     +1   
      denote the corresponding
active and passive changes in levels, and   
     +1 and   
     +1 their equivalents in logs.
We estimate a rebalancing model for individual assets. In Table 8, we report the
pooled and yearly regressions of the log active change   
     +1 on the initial share and
the log passive change   
     +1, both for stocks (panel A) and funds (panel B). The
rebalancing coe cient is only slightly more negative for stocks than for funds, and
approximately equal to one sixth. Thus, when we focus on partial sales, the rebalancing
coe cient is roughly constant across funds and stocks. In the Appendix, we report the
rebalancing regressions in levels, and also nd evidence of active rebalancing at the asset
level. The rebalancing coe cients in levels are somewhat larger in absolute value, but
also more variable across regressions.
The interpretation of Table 8 is complicated by the ambiguous predictions of -
nancial theory. In a mean-variance portfolio choice problem with constant investment
opportunities, the optimal weights of individual assets in the risky portfolio are time-
invariant, which implies complete rebalancing with   
     +1 =    
     +1; but partial
22rebalancing might be justied by a variety of factors such as changes in risk and return
expectations, taxes, transactions costs, or Bayesian updating of beliefs about mutual
fund management. In the Appendix, we ask how the propensity to rebalance individual
assets varies with household and portfolio characteristics, but do not nd any strong
e ects.
In this section we have shown that households are much more likely to fully sell a
stock when it has performed well, and slightly more likely to sell a losing fund. This nd-
ing is consistent with the literature on the disposition e ect. If a household continues
to own a stock or mutual fund, however, its behavior is well described by a rebalancing
model with a rebalancing coe cient of about one sixth, and the rebalancing propensity
is almost the same for stocks and for mutual funds.
6. Trading Decisions and Risky Portfolio Rebalancing
We now investigate how rebalancing of the complete portfolio, which was documented
in Sections 3 and 4, relates to the dynamics of individual asset holdings discussed in
Section 5. We focus on the contribution of di erent asset classes and transaction types
to the overall active change of the risky share.
The active change of the risky share between dates   and   +1can be decomposed
as
    +1 =
X
 
(      +1    
 
     +1)  (6.1)
where       +1 denotes the share of asset   in the complete portfolio at the end of year
  +1   and  
 
     +1 is the passive share of asset   in the complete portfolio if the agent
does not trade during the year:
 
 
     +1 =
      (1 +     +1)
    (1 +     ) + (1       )(1 +   )
 
The individual terms on the right hand side of (6.1) can be grouped into specic
asset classes   (fund or stock) and transaction types   (purchase or sale):
    +1 =
X
   
        +1 
We can also distinguish between partial sales, full sales, partial purchases (assets already
held by the household), and full purchases (new types of assets).
Each component of the active change         +1 can be regressed on the passive
change of the risky portfolio     +1  the demeaned initial risky share        ¯       and
a time-dependent intercept. The corresponding rebalancing coe cients  1      +1 add
up to the overall rebalancing coe cient:
P
      
1    +1 =  1  This decomposition allows
23us to identify how various asset classes and transaction types contribute to portfolio
rebalancing.
Given our ndings in Section 4 on the disposition e ect, it is also useful to distin-
guish between transactions carried out by lucky and unlucky households. Specically, a
household is classied as lucky if the return on its risky portfolio exceeds the population
average during the same year. In Table 9, we report the rebalancing coe cients   
1    +1
and their  -statistics, and refer the reader to the appendix for the full regression re-
sults. Lucky and unlucky households both have a rebalancing coe cient of about  0 5,
which is slightly larger in absolute value for lucky households. Stocks and funds play
an important role in rebalancing for both groups of investors. We have veried that
our results are almost identical when the median return is used as an alternative cuto ,
or when we consider households in the top third and bottom third of risky portfolio
performance.
When we disaggregate sales and purchases, however, we do see important di erences
between lucky and unlucky households. Lucky households rebalance primarily by ad-
justing their stock sales and fund purchases. The rebalancing coe cient of  0 58 is
almost entirely explained by the coe cients of full sales (-0.29) and partial purchases
(-0.24). That is, lucky households, who need to reduce their holdings of risky assets,
achieve this objective by fully selling more stocks and buying less mutual funds than
they would otherwise.
Unlucky households, on the other hand, mainly rebalance by adjusting their pur-
chases of new assets. The rebalancing coe cient (equal to -0.50) is primarily driven by
stock purchases (-0.30) and fund purchases (-0.13). The impact of asset sales is marginal.
Households thus primarily rebalance by increasing their (full) stock sales and reduc-
ing their fund purchases when they are lucky, and increasing their purchases of risky
assets (primarily stocks) when they are unlucky. These common strategies minimize
transaction costs. The exception is the full sale of stocks by lucky households, which
may be caused by the disposition e ect.
In the Appendix, we investigate how these common rebalancing strategies are in-
uenced by household characteristics. We nd that wealthier households with more
diversied portfolios tend to rebalance more strongly through purchases of risky assets
but less through stock sales. Thus, it appears that more sophisticated households are
less prone to the disposition e ect and make greater use of rebalancing strategies that
minimize transaction costs. In addition, we nd possible substitution e ects between
purchasing strategies. Households with substantial and diversied portfolios of funds
rebalance more strongly through fund purchases and less through stock purchases.
247. Conclusion
The burgeoning eld of household nance asks how households manage their nancial
a airs, and whether they act in a way that is consistent with the normative literature
on portfolio choice. Our previous paper (CCS 2007) studied household diversication
at a point in time, while this paper looks at changes in household behavior over time,
specically decisions to scale up or down the share of risky assets in the total portfolio,
to enter or exit risky nancial markets, to fully sell individual risky assets, and to scale
up or down the share of individual assets in the risky portfolio. These decisions are
important in themselves, and are also particularly revealing because households rarely
delegate these decisions to nancial intermediaries.
Although other papers have looked at the dynamics of household risk-taking, our
dataset gives us the unique ability to relate household decisions to the properties of
the initial portfolio. When studying movements in the risky asset share, we nd that
households overall have a surprisingly large propensity to rebalance, o setting about
half the passive changes in the risky share with active changes.
We can identify the propensity to rebalance, distinguishing it from mean-reversion in
the risky share and aggregate shifts in the desired risky share, because households have
heterogeneous portfolios which generate cross-sectional variation in passive changes in
the risky share. This implies that households can rebalance actively even in a closed
economy general equilibrium; households with lower than average returns can buy stocks
from households with higher than average returns. The microeconomic nature of our
results means that we have little to say about rebalancing by the Swedish household
sector as a whole in response to aggregate shocks, but such rebalancing appears to be
quite limited in our short dataset.
We develop an adjustment model with di erent target risky shares across house-
holds. We nd that more educated and wealthier households, holding better diversied
portfolios, tend to rebalance more actively. Wealthier households also reduced their
target risky shares less during the bear market of the early 2000’s.
Some nancial theories imply that as a household becomes richer, its target risky
share should increase. This will be the case, for example, if households have declining
risk aversion, follow portfolio insurance policies, or derive utility from consumption that
is surplus to a slowly evolving habit level. We nd evidence consistent with this view
once we control for sluggish portfolio adjustment.
Our results on decisions to exit risky nancial markets and to fully sell individual
risky positions are intriguingly consistent with previous research on the disposition e ect
among stockholders and performance sensitivity among mutual fund investors. We nd
that high returns on directly held stock portfolios strongly increase the probability that
households will exit direct stockholding, while this e ect is almost absent for mutual
25fund portfolios. At the level of individual assets, a household is considerably more
likely to fully sell a stock during a year if it is a “winner” that has performed well
during the year, but this tendency is again much weaker for mutual funds. One possible
explanation for these patterns is that individual investors buy stocks that they perceive
to be undervalued, and maintain xed beliefs about fundamental value in the face of
market price movements; but they buy mutual funds that they perceive to be well
managed, and update their beliefs about manager skill in response to mutual fund
performance.
These asymmetries between winners and losers, and between stocks and mutual
funds, disappear when households adjust the shares of individual risky assets within
their risky portfolios, without fully selling them. Rebalancing for assets that households
continue to own is close to symmetric, and it actively o sets about one sixth of the
passive changes in individual asset shares caused by individual asset performance.
We ask how households use partial and full sales and purchases of stocks and mutual
funds to alter their overall risky shares. We nd that households primarily rebalance
by increasing their full sales of stock and reducing their fund purchases when they have
higher than average portfolio returns, and by increasing their purchases of risky assets
when they have lower than average returns.
Finally, we examine how household characteristics a ect decisions to trade individual
assets. We nd that wealthy investors with high risky shares and diversied portfolios of
individual stocks are less likely to fully sell winning stocks, and more likely to fully sell
losing stocks. Dhar and Zhu (2006) have documented a similar pattern for US investors
with high self-reported income. Any model of the disposition e ect must explain this
nding that it is not uniform across the population.
Many papers in the household nance literature, including Campbell (2006) and
CCS (2007), have reported that educated, better o  households conform more closely
to the predictions of standard nance theory. Rebalancing behavior and decisions to
fully sell stock positions are two more examples of this phenomenon.
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32TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes:  The table reports summary statistics of aggregate holdings (panel A), participation rates and the risky share (panel B) and asset 
returns (panel C). Panel A also includes the official statistics reported by Statistics Sweden (stocks) and Fondbolagens Förening (funds) 
when they are available. The participation rates in panel B are computed on the random subsample of 100,000 households considered 
throughout the text, while the average risky share (panel B) and pooled index (panel C) are based on the subset of participants at the end 
of each year in the random subsample.
B. Participation and Average Risky Share
1999 2000 2001 2002
Fraction of households holding:
 - risky assets 61.6% 66.4% 66.0% 64.9%
 - individual stocks 30.0% 37.2% 37.3% 38.5%
 - risky mutual funds 54.6% 58.7% 58.2% 56.4%
 - both individual stocks and risky funds 23.0% 29.5% 29.5% 29.9%
Average risky share (equal-weighted) 56.5% 56.6% 52.3% 45.2%
Average risky share (wealth-weighted) 74.9% 73.7% 66.1% 54.7%
A. Aggregate Holdings of Participants (Billion Dollars)
Stocks 61.7 64.3 54.6 54.6 45.3 47.1 29.8 32.2
Risky mutual funds: 53.4 50.4 52.7 44.0 45.4 29.4 29.5
° Equity funds 49.5 46.6 48.8 39.7 40.9 24.8 25.2
° Bond funds 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.3
Cash 48.7 47.5 54.3 56.7
Total financial wealth 163.9 152.5 143.7 115.9
Micro 
Data
Official 
Statistics
Micro 
Data
Official 
Statistics
Micro 
Data
Official 
Statistics
Micro 
Data
Official 
Statistics
2002 1999 2000 2001
C. Asset Returns
1999 2000 2001 2002
Interest rate 3.1% 3.9% 4.1% 4.1%
MSCI Sweden index 79.2% -18.0% -26.8% -48.6%
Pooled index (equal-weighted) NA -4.3% -11.1% -32.1%
Pooled index (value-weighted) NA -6.1% -11.6% -32.2%
MSCI world index (in Swedish kronor) 27.2% -7.1% -11.3% -37.9%
MSCI World index (in U.S. dollars) 19.0% -18.5% -20.7% -22.4%TABLE 2. REGRESSION OF ACTIVE CHANGE ON PASSIVE CHANGE
A. In Levels
B. In Logs
Notes:  This table reports the pooled and yearly regressions of the active change on the passive change, both in levels (panel A) and in logs (panel B). Year t regressions 
include households that participate in risky asset markets both at the end of year t-1 and at the end of year t. Pooled regressions are based on all the data points used in 
the yearly regressions, that is on households that participate in two consecutive years.
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Passive change -0.504 -53.10 -0.640 -27.90 -0.608 -28.70 -0.443 -35.50
Initial risky share (demeaned) -0.186 -144.00 -0.194 -88.10 -0.176 -82.40 -0.189 -78.70
Intercept 0.026 33.40 -0.030 -34.10 -0.022 -18.20
1999 dummy 0.028 40.40
2000 dummy -0.027 -38.10
2001 dummy -0.027 -26.70
Adjusted R
2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10
Number of observations 187,780 60,341 64,119 63,320
2000 2001 All years  2002
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Passive change in logs -0.442 -45.40 -0.745 -35.80 -0.534 -24.30 -0.423 -30.40
Log initial risky share (demeaned) -0.199 -137.00 -0.275 -123.00 -0.152 -62.90 -0.161 -56.40
Intercept 0.098 37.50 -0.067 -22.50 -0.066 -15.00
1999 dummy 0.112 42.80
2000 dummy -0.060 -22.70
2001 dummy -0.071 -20.30
Adjusted R
2 0.14 0.24 0.09 0.10
Number of observations 187,780 60,341 64,119 63,320
2000 2001 2002 All years TABLE 3. ADJUSTMENT MODEL WITHOUT CHARACTERISTICS
Notes: This table reports the IV and OLS estimates of the adjustment model without characteristics. 
The  estimation  is  based  on  households  that  participate  in  risky  asset  markets  at  the  end  of  two 
consecutive years. 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Reduced-Form Parameters
Change in log passive share -0.121 -44.20 0.363 39.30
Intercept 2001 -0.111 -42.00 -0.139 -46.30
Intercept 2002 -0.246 -92.10 -0.119 -31.50
Structural Parameters
Adjustment speed  0 1.121 410.00 0.637 68.90
Target change  0,2001 -0.099 -41.50 -0.219 -35.60
Target change  0,2002 -0.219 -95.60 -0.186 -39.90
Adjusted R
2 0.08
Number of observations 120,067 120,067
OLS IVTABLE 4. ADJUSTMENT MODEL WITH CHARACTERISTICS
A. Parameter Estimates
B. Cross-Sectional Distribution (2001)
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the adjustment model (panel A) and the implied cross-sectional distribution of the speed parameter and target change in 2001 (panel 
B). The estimation is based on households that participate in risky asset markets at the end of two consecutive years and for which the immigration dummy is available. 
Disposable income is averaged over the previous three years. All characteristics are demeaned year by year, and continuous financial characteristics other than the change in 
financial wealth are normalized to have unit standard deviation in each cross-section. Portfolio characteristics are in natural units.
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercepts
Adjustment speed  0 0.716 69.30 0.739 68.00
Target change  0,2001 -0.154 -8.27 -0.121 -6.15
Target change  0,2002 -0.160 -8.57 -0.136 -6.91
Portfolio Characteristics
Standard deviation of risky portfolio 0.061 1.84 -0.384 -8.94 0.072 2.04 -0.258 -5.21
Sharpe ratio of risky portfolio 1.137 9.14 -0.536 -6.14 1.206 9.15 -0.508 -5.71
Financial Characteristics
Disposable income 0.011 2.38 0.014 0.77 0.008 1.58 -0.020 -1.07
Private pension premia/income -0.002 -0.42 -0.007 -1.27 -0.002 -0.41 -0.011 -1.88
Log financial wealth 0.037 3.14 0.051 10.70 0.048 3.79 0.093 10.60
Change in log financial wealth 0.285 5.93
Log real estate wealth 0.007 0.82 -0.082 -6.42 0.010 1.00 -0.127 -8.21
Log total liability 0.032 2.72 0.022 2.33 0.032 2.63 0.040 3.93
Retired dummy -0.073 -2.03 0.022 0.48 -0.083 -2.19 0.020 0.43
Unemployment dummy -0.056 -2.05 0.046 0.89 -0.068 -2.32 0.054 1.03
Entrepreneur dummy -0.083 -2.18 -0.001 -0.03 -0.092 -2.28 -0.006 -0.28
Student dummy -0.051 -0.97 0.070 0.55 -0.045 -0.80 0.049 0.37
Demographic Characteristics
Age 0.001 1.72 -0.002 -4.60 0.002 2.23 -0.002 -4.09
Household size -0.014 -2.33 -0.017 -3.59 -0.017 -2.63 -0.013 -2.79
High school dummy 0.085 3.75 -0.003 -0.31 0.087 3.63 -0.009 -0.99
Post-high school dummy 0.043 2.54 -0.003 -0.30 0.049 2.74 -0.008 -0.97
Dummy for unavailable education data 0.087 1.84 0.103 1.69 0.100 2.02 0.108 1.73
Immigration dummy 0.000 0.01 -0.022 -2.14 0.002 0.07 -0.024 -2.37
Speed Target change Target change Speed
5th Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
95th Percentile 0.901 0.199 0.045
-0.225
-0.178
-0.094
0.862
0.536
0.815
-0.286 -0.370
0.677 -0.230
0.750 -0.144
-0.024
0.660
Speed
0.726
0.786
0.529
Target change Target Change SpeedTABLE 5. ENTRY AND EXIT PROBABILITIES
Notes: The table reports the pooled probit regression of a household’s entry to and exit from risky asset markets. Explanatory variables include yearly fixed effects and 
portfolio, financial, and demographic characteristics. Disposable income is averaged over the previous three years. For each regression, we report the linear coefficient, t-
statistic, and marginal effect of each predicting variable. All characteristics are demeaned year by year, and continuous financial characteristics are normalized to have unit 
standard deviation in each cross-section. Portfolio characteristics are in natural units. The marginal effect is assessed by computing the impact on the dependent variable (in 
levels) of increasing a non-dummy regressor by one standard deviation, or setting a dummy variable equal to one, in year 2001. We exclude households for which the 
immigration dummy is unavailable. 
Estimate t-stat Change Estimate t-stat Change Estimate t-stat Change
Portfolio Characteristics
Initial risky share -0.571 -24.70 -0.81%
Standard deviation of risky portfolio -0.278 -5.21 -0.21%
Dummy for risky share>95 % 0.065 1.81 0.09%
Sharpe ratio of risky portfolio -0.461 -4.64 -0.16%
Gain of risky portfolio 0.477 6.28 0.16%
Loss of risky portfolio 0.396 6.40 0.37%
Financial Characteristics
Disposable income 0.093 13.70 0.88% 0.015 3.33 0.09% 0.014 3.04 0.08%
Private pension premia/income 0.031 6.11 0.27% -0.084 -6.59 -0.46% -0.076 -5.96 -0.39%
Log financial wealth 0.220 29.40 2.33% -0.356 -46.60 -1.48% -0.290 -36.00 -1.22%
Log real estate wealth 0.104 15.70 1.00% -0.069 -10.70 -0.38% -0.074 -11.40 -0.38%
Log total liability 0.071 8.48 0.66% -0.026 -3.10 -0.15% -0.017 -2.03 -0.10%
Retirement dummy 0.001 0.02 0.01% 0.018 0.69 0.11% 0.013 0.48 0.07%
Unemployment dummy -0.039 -2.31 -0.33% 0.093 4.69 0.60% 0.087 4.31 0.53%
Entrepreneur dummy 0.035 0.95 0.31% -0.030 -0.85 -0.17% -0.065 -1.80 -0.34%
Student dummy -0.130 -4.36 -1.01% 0.164 4.71 1.13% 0.181 5.16 1.21%
Demographic Characteristics
Age -0.018 -28.50 -2.19% 0.005 7.56 0.52% 0.005 7.02 0.46%
Household size -0.054 -9.23 -0.52% 0.015 2.72 0.12% -0.012 -2.06 -0.08%
High school dummy 0.115 7.26 1.11% -0.058 -3.47 -0.32% -0.049 -2.89 -0.26%
Post-high school dummy 0.138 8.89 1.36% -0.062 -4.01 -0.34% -0.050 -3.16 -0.26%
Dummy for unavailable education data -0.089 -3.12 -0.72% -0.001 -0.04 -0.01% 0.001 0.03 0.00%
Immigration dummy -0.095 -6.03 -0.76% 0.201 11.80 1.44% 0.197 11.40 1.33%
Rate of entry/exit in 2000 15.8% 1.9% 1.9%
Rate of entry/exit in 2001 5.7% 3.4% 3.4%
Rate of entry/exit in 2002 4.4% 3.9% 3.9%
Exit  Entry Notes: The table reports a pooled probit regression that a household sells all its risky assets (first set of three columns), all its stocks (middle set of three columns), and all its risky 
mutual funds (last set of three columns). We include yearly fixed effects, and average out disposable income over the previous three years.  For each regression we report the 
linear coefficient, t-statistic, and marginal effect of each predicting variable. All characteristics are demeaned year by year, and continuous financial characteristics are normalized 
to have unit standard deviation in each cross-section. Portfolio characteristics are in natural units. The marginal effect is assessed by computing the impact on the dependent 
variable (in levels) of increasing a non-dummy regressor by one standard deviation, or setting a dummy variable equal to one, in year 2001. The regressions are based on the set 
of households that hold both stocks and funds. We exclude households for which the immigration dummy is unavailable.
TABLE 6. IMPACT OF STOCK AND MUTUAL FUND HOLDINGS ON EXIT PROBABILITY
Estimate t-stat Change Estimate t-stat Change Estimate t-stat Change
Portfolio Characteristics
Initial risky share -0.292 -4.11 -0.08% -0.179 -4.71 -0.25% -0.368 -10.20 -0.48%
Standard deviation of risky portfolio 0.169 1.14 0.02% 0.373 4.62 0.26% 0.381 4.82 0.25%
Stock component of Sharpe ratio -1.277 -2.88 -0.10% -3.302 -13.40 -1.17% -0.279 -1.23 -0.12%
Fund component of Sharpe ratio -1.192 -3.43 -0.12% -0.762 -4.08 -0.43% -1.755 -9.53 -0.86%
Gain of stock portfolio 0.269 2.57 0.04% 0.694 13.20 0.56% -0.105 -1.19 -0.07%
Loss of stock portfolio 0.081 0.81 0.02% 0.016 0.29 0.02% -0.045 -0.83 -0.05%
Gain of mutual fund portfolio 0.165 0.28 0.01% -0.338 -0.85 -0.05% 0.443 1.67 0.07%
Loss of mutual fund portfolio 0.439 1.85 0.07% -0.090 -0.66 -0.07% 0.264 2.25 0.20%
Financial Characteristics
Disposable income 0.014 1.79 0.02% 0.012 1.63 0.07% -0.045 -0.83 0.08%
Private pension premia/income -0.137 -3.55 -0.13% -0.031 -2.20 -0.17% 0.443 1.67 -0.39%
Log financial wealth -0.169 -7.79 -0.16% -0.209 -17.90 -0.98% 0.264 2.25 -0.76%
Log real estate wealth -0.060 -3.31 -0.06% -0.033 -3.28 -0.19% 0.014 2.31 -0.24%
Log total liability -0.026 -1.02 -0.03% 0.017 1.30 0.10% -0.076 -5.03 -0.04%
Retirement dummy 0.044 0.57 0.05% 0.132 3.34 0.87% -0.158 -14.60 0.16%
Unemployment dummy 0.196 3.05 0.30% 0.003 0.07 0.02% -0.044 -4.62 0.77%
Entrepreneur dummy -0.033 -0.33 -0.04% -0.106 -2.08 -0.55% -0.008 -0.61 -0.02%
Student dummy 0.156 1.34 0.22% 0.077 1.16 0.48% 0.028 0.78 1.78%
Demographic Characteristics
Age 0.002 0.96 0.04% -0.003 -2.62 -0.24% 0.122 3.39 0.27%
Household size 0.027 1.58 0.04% 0.040 4.74 0.31% -0.003 -0.07 -0.43%
High school dummy -0.013 -0.23 -0.01% 0.005 0.17 0.03% 0.249 3.96 -0.20%
Post-high school dummy 0.014 0.30 0.02% 0.005 0.23 0.03% 0.003 2.86 -0.26%
Dummy for unavailable education data 0.121 1.52 0.17% 0.144 3.25 0.96% -0.066 -7.27 -0.22%
Immigration dummy 0.149 2.76 0.21% 0.112 3.73 0.72% -0.037 -1.32 0.91%
Rate of exit in 2000 0.3% 2.9% 2.2%
Rate of exit in 2001 0.5% 3.2% 3.0%
Rate of exit in 2002 0.6% 2.6% 3.3%
Risky Assets Stocks Mutual FundsTABLE 7. PROBABILITY OF FULLY SELLING AN ASSET
Notes: This table reports a pooled probit regression that a household fully sells an asset. We distinguish between stocks and funds, and classify a security as a winner 
(loser) if it yields a positive (negative) return during the year. Each regression includes the following set of explanatory variables: yearly fixed effects (unreported), 
gain/loss of asset j, non-interacted characteristics (unreported), and interacted characteristics. The gain/loss of asset j is the absolute value of the asset’s performance 
during the year, and disposable income is averaged over the previous three years. The estimation is based on households that participate in risky asset markets at 
the  end  of  two  consecutive  years  and  for  which  the  immigration  dummy  is  available.  All  characteristics  are  demeaned  year  by  year,  and  continuous  financial 
characteristics are normalized to have unit standard deviation in each cross-section. Portfolio characteristics are in natural units. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered by household.
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Gain/loss of asset j 0.928 46.80 0.112 7.00 0.359 8.86 0.364 13.70
Portfolio Characteristics
Initial risky share -0.395 -4.12 -0.053 -0.84 -0.320 -1.98 -0.160 -1.77
Standard deviation of risky portfolio -0.657 -4.14 0.241 1.89 0.062 0.14 0.645 2.49
Stock component of Sharpe ratio -1.689 -3.39 1.687 4.28 -1.700 -1.41 -1.280 -1.82
Fund component of Sharpe ratio 0.362 0.78 0.841 2.32 -1.493 -1.46 0.388 0.68
Financial Characteristics
Disposable income -0.008 -0.53 -0.024 -2.82 -0.017 -0.30 -0.066 -2.49
Private pension premia/income 0.000 0.03 -0.025 -1.50 0.067 1.30 0.004 0.08
Log financial wealth -0.082 -3.54 0.072 4.08 0.096 1.86 0.151 4.64
Log real estate wealth -0.038 -1.80 -0.007 -0.41 -0.029 -0.72 0.012 0.51
Log total liability -0.093 -4.12 0.046 2.56 -0.015 -0.30 -0.021 -0.69
Retirement dummy -0.061 -0.85 0.010 0.18 0.103 0.62 0.202 2.15
Unemployment dummy 0.069 1.02 -0.020 -0.34 0.016 0.11 0.003 0.03
Entrepreneur dummy 0.031 0.41 0.011 0.17 -0.122 -0.68 0.264 2.31
Student dummy 0.147 1.12 0.055 0.52 -0.571 -2.35 -0.194 -1.27
Demographic Characteristics
Age 0.011 5.36 0.002 1.59 -0.008 -1.98 0.014 5.37
Household size 0.005 0.32 0.003 0.22 0.054 1.75 -0.045 -2.23
High school dummy -0.014 -0.22 0.044 0.94 -0.148 -1.28 -0.160 -2.40
Post-high school dummy 0.016 0.36 -0.048 -1.53 -0.097 -1.15 -0.029 -0.57
Dummy for unavailable education data 0.039 0.38 0.126 1.57 -0.099 -0.43 -0.170 -1.53
Immigration dummy -0.116 -1.74 0.010 0.22 0.042 0.38 -0.105 -1.43
Share of asset j in risky portfolio -0.816 -39.20 -0.847 -57.40
Number of observations 139,155 285,223 67,623 478,659
Funds  
Winners Losers
Characteristics interacted with return
Winners Losers
Stocks  TABLE 8. ASSET-LEVEL ACTIVE CHANGE
Notes: This table reports the regression of asset j’s active change in logs on the asset’s passive change and initial share in the risky portfolio, both for stocks (panel A) and 
risky mutual funds (panel B). We include partial sales, continued holdings and partial purchases, but exclude full sales and purchases of securities that are not held at all at 
the beginning of the period. The estimation is based on households that participate in risky asset markets at the end of two consecutive years. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by household. 
A. Stocks
B. Risky Mutual Funds
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Passive change of asset j in logs -0.179 -61.10 -0.069 -9.87 -0.162 -32.20 -0.220 -56.70
Log initial share of asset j -0.038 -46.10 -0.058 -34.60 -0.041 -26.40 -0.023 -16.70
Intercept -0.271 -44.60 -0.127 -25.70 -0.068 -15.20
2000 dummy -0.204 -49.10
2001 dummy -0.118 -35.60
2002 dummy -0.117 -36.00
Adjusted R
2 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06
Number of observations 354,294 90,951 126,769 136,574
All years 2000 2001 2002
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Passive change of asset j in logs -0.165 -22.70 -0.189 -10.40 -0.153 -11.50 -0.162 -18.60
Log initial risky share of j -0.091 -93.90 -0.109 -64.50 -0.104 -71.00 -0.062 -49.10
Intercept -0.268 -82.70 -0.183 -66.80 -0.126 -50.50
2000 dummy -0.230 -95.60
2001 dummy -0.155 -69.40
2002 dummy -0.191 -83.90
Adjusted R
2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04
Number of observations 498,502 147,930 175,692 174,880
All years 2000 2001 2002TABLE 9. CONTRIBUTION OF SALES AND PURCHASES TO PORTFOLIO REBALANCING
Notes: The table decomposes the portfolio rebalancing coefficient into its various components: (partial or full) purchases or sales of stocks and funds by lucky and 
unlucky  households.  For  each  transaction  type  and  household  group,  we  report  the  rebalancing  coefficient  and  t-statistic  of  the  corresponding  rebalancing 
regression in levels, with yearly fixed effects and the risky share included as controls. A household is defined as lucky (unlucky) if the passive return on its risky 
portfolio during the year is higher (lower) than the cross-sectional average.
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A. Cross-sectional Distribution of Risky Share B. Standard Deviation of Complete Portfolio
Notes: Panel A illustrates the cross-sectional distribution of the risky share wh,t at the end of years 1999 to 2002. Panel B reports the relation between the standard 
deviation of the complete portfolio wh,t  h,tand the risky share wh,t. 
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Notes: The scatter plot illustrates the passive change (panel A), active change (panel B), and total change (panel C) versus the initial risky share for a random sample of 
10,000 households. All changes are computed in levels between 2001 and 2002.A. Entire Period (1999 to 2002) B. 1999 to 2000
C. 2000 to 2001 D. 2001 to 2002
FIGURE 3. RISKY SHARE DECOMPOSITION
Risky share at end of 1999 (%) Risky share at end of 1999 (%)
Risky share at end of 2000 (%) Risky share at end of 2001 (%)
Notes: The figure illustrates the equal-weighted average of the total change, active change and passive change in bins of the initial risky share. The changes are 
reported in percentages and computed in levels over the entire period (panel A) and over each year of the sample (panels B to D). 
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